The Ethics of Hunting
CAN We HAve Our ANiMAl eTHiCS AND eAT THeM TOO?
By Michael P. Nelson, Ph.D., and Kelly F. Millenbah, Ph.D.
Agreat challenge confronts the wildlife community. So does a great opportunity. In 1923, Aldo Leopold observed that “one
cannot round out a real understanding [of con-servation] without likewise considering its moral
aspects” (Leopold 1923). The moral aspect, or
ethics, of hunting is the subject of one of the most
persistent debates within the conservation community. Eighty-six years after Leopold’s writing, The
Wildlife Society’s leadership continues to call for a
meaningful discussion on the moral aspects of hunting (Svedarsky et al. 2008, Hutchins 2008). In that
interim, little serious work has been accomplished
in the field of wildlife ethics (Vucetich and Nelson
2007). Apparently it is difficult to even begin.
begins by mischaracterizing animal welfare arguments (e.g., suggesting animal welfarists believe all
farm animals should be released into the wild) then
readily swatting down a straw man. Along the way
attacks focus on people or organizations instead of
arguments; evoke false dichotomies between reason
and emotion; and lazily brandish science as a shield,
forgetting that the other side backs their arguments
with science as well. Advocates of hunting may find
themselves defending immoral hunters or employing
arguments to defend hunting that the public does not
accept and they themselves do not really believe.
To date, the literature on both sides of the stalemated dispute over whether hunting is ethical is
dominated by sloppy reasoning and tired, Nugent-esque rhetoric (Dizard 2003). Those who actively
oppose hunting seem, at times, to function in an
ecological vacuum—either denying that life necessitates death or suggesting that humans are not
natural beings. Those who actively support hunting sometimes do so by forwarding incomplete and
unpersuasive arguments, or by denying living creatures the moral relevance demanded by the general
public. In the debate over the ethics of hunting,
dialogue has been replaced by dogmatism, honesty
by hostility, and progress by platitudes.
This second option, of bolstering hunting supporters by tearing down animal welfare arguments, is
perhaps the usual route, given that many individuals
view animal welfare ethics as a major threat to hunting. Yet there are reasons to think this line of defense
is not preferable, not the least of which might be that
one may knowingly embrace an immoral position.
More provocatively, the assumed tension between
animal ethics and hunting might be false. There is,
for instance, good reason to believe some of hunting’s own codes of conduct—most notably the ethic
of “clean kill”—presuppose that animals matter, that
their moral standing is greater than zero.
Michael P. Nelson,
Ph.D., is an Associate
Professor at Michigan
State University
jointly appointed
in the Lyman
Briggs College,
the Department
of Fisheries and
Wildlife, and the
Department of
Philosophy.
Credit: Heather varco
A serious and rigorous conversation regarding the
direct moral standing of non-human animals began
in the mid-1970s (Singer 1975). When confronted
with articulate and reasoned arguments from animal welfare ethicists, those interested in defending
hunting have three choices (although normally only
the first two are exercised). First, some individuals
might acquiesce, admit that hunting is fundamentally
incompatible with the direct moral standing of non-human animals, and stop hunting. Such conversions
happen; this might explain some of the loss of active
hunters and some of the difficulty recruiting new ones.
There is, however, a third option. Wildlife professionals and hunters could recognize the direct
moral standing of animals and work to unite this
recognition with the possibility of hunting and
eating animals. This route assumes that the idea of
animals having direct moral standing is compatible
with hunting. We are told repeatedly, and we seem
to believe, that respect and killing are incompatible.
But are they? There are reasons to be suspicious of
this assumed conflict.
Kelly F. Millenbah,
Ph.D., is an Associate
Professor in the
Department of
Fisheries and Wildlife
at Michigan State
University.
Credit: Michigan State university
Second, some might fight to deny non-human
animals direct moral standing. This route typically
For one, those who defend hunting may not fully
understand the objections of those we label “
anti-hunter.” When pressed, what many, though certainly
not all, so-called anti-hunters oppose is not hunting per se, but what they see as a lack of humility
and respect (Dizard 2003). They want the hunter
to honestly signal that the taking of an animal’s life
is a serious matter. The desire for this recognition,
